

**TOP SECRET**

27 February 1963

Copy No. *Ed-8*

# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



State Dept. review completed

GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification

**TOP SECRET**

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800490001-3

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800490001-3

27 February 1963

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN**

**CONTENTS**




25X1

3. Sino-Soviet Relations: People's Daily rekindles Sino-Soviet dispute. (Page 2)
4. France-US-EEC: France likely to impede US-EEC negotiations on US Trade Expansion Act. (Page 3)



25X1

7. Burma: Ne Win's regime is in trouble. (Page 6)
8. Notes: Cuba;  Syria. (Page 7)

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800490001-3

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800490001-3

Sino-Soviet Relations: The Peiping People's Daily editorial of 27 February sets conditions for an international Communist conference which Khrushchev is certain to reject.

The editorial demands that Moscow first cease its attacks on the Chinese and Albanians while permitting Peiping to continue its condemnation of Yugoslavia. It also calls on the Soviets to acknowledge "past mistakes" and apologize to the parties they have denounced.

The editorial reflects the continuing severe strains in the Sino-Soviet alliance. Although Peiping characterized Mao Tse-tung's meeting with the Soviet ambassador last Saturday as "cordial," People's Daily on Sunday directed its fire at French and Italian Communists for "attacking the Communist Party of China." Then on 26 February, the Chinese newspaper carried the text of an Albanian editorial which suggested that Khrushchev was trying to establish a "false unity" in the bloc.

Despite Khrushchev's request for a pause in the polemics, the language of the Chinese editorial is up to the level of the strongest invective that Peiping has employed in the Sino-Soviet dispute. It explicitly attacks the Communist Party of the Soviet Union for "major mistakes" at its 20th party congress, scorns fears that "even a tiny spark can cause a world conflagration," and condemns the Soviet attitude on the Sino-Indian border dispute. It insists on Chinese independence of Moscow, criticizing the actions of the French Communist Party in following "somebody else's lead" on Cuba.

25X1

\* France--US--EEC: [France is likely to drag its feet in the forthcoming US-EEC negotiations on the US Trade Expansion Act, but will probably stop short of disrupting them.]

[Ambassador Bohlen in Paris points out that, for more than a year, French officials have made no effort to conceal their distaste for the Trade Expansion Act.]

[On tariffs, Paris has made it unmistakably clear that it is in no mood to accept reductions of the magnitude envisaged by the act. The French have argued that large tariff reductions would weaken the cohesiveness and "essential European character" of the EEC. French business leaders are also emphasizing that there must be more time for European enterprises to merge and consolidate on the American scale before trade barriers between the US and Europe can be substantially reduced.]

[Bohlen believes that Paris will agree to some tariff reductions, however, and be generally more forthcoming in the negotiations if the other five EEC members do not block further French initiatives on the internal development of the EEC. Leaders of the other five generally support the objectives of the US act, but there is some sentiment for the French position in all these countries.]

25X1

25X1

25X1

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800490001-3

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T00975A006800490001-3

Burma: The Ne Win military regime is in trouble.

There is widespread discontent and apprehension among both urban and rural segments of the population over acceleration of the government's nationalization program and the recent ouster of moderate Aung Gyi--formerly number-two man. Farmers, particularly, are bitter over new regulations governing the sale of rice to the state.

While civilian opposition is not unified at present, discontent is serious and spontaneous demonstrations could develop at any time. Government repression would fan civil strife and might lead to disaffection among the military.

The present difficulties probably caused Ne Win to postpone indefinitely several state visits he had scheduled.

25X1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



NOTES

Cuba: Havana Radio has appealed for demonstrations in the Dominican Republic against Venezuelan President Betancourt, who is attending today's presidential inauguration there. A communiqué from the Cuba-based Dominican Liberation Movement urged Dominicans to repudiate this "bloody scourge...the darling of US interests" and thus show their solidarity with the "democratic and patriotic forces" now fighting in Venezuela.

25X1

25X1

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

\*Syria: [An extensive shake-up in the Syrian officer corps--reportedly involving the transfer of a number of senior officers--occurred on 23 February following an attempted mutiny on 21 February at the key Qatana garrison near Damascus. The shake-up has increased tension in the army and may precipitate another coup attempt.]

25X1

25X1

27 Feb 63

DAILY BRIEF

8

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board, on 21 February 1963, approved the following national intelligence estimate:

SNIE 85-2-63: "Reactions to U. S. Low-Level Overflights of Cuba"

25X1

27 Feb 63

DAILY BRIEF

9

THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Director, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T0075A006800490001-3

**TOP SECRET**

Approved For Release 2003/05/16 : CIA-RDP79T0075A006800490001-3

**TOP SECRET**